A Critique of Consensus Process: Theory, Practice and Implications

This is the html version of the file http://www.dsame.com/zmcc.pdf

To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url: http://www.dsame.com/zmccwebpage.htm

This website is neither affiliated with the authors of this page nor responsible for its content.

These search terms have been highlighted:

zoe

mitchell

critique

consensus

Page 1

A Critique of Consensus Process: Theory, Practice and Implications

By: Melissa Leigh Ballowe (aka: Zoe Mitchell)

A St. Mary’s Project

Advised by: Professor Samuel A. Chambers

December 2002

Page 2

Beginning the Circle: An Introduction

I have known for years that if I do not write things down I will forget them and

things that I considered to be important will be lost. That observation is the context for

this entire project. On September 10, 2001, I was preparing myself for a meeting of the

Washington, DC Independent Media Center (DC IMC), a group that, like other radical

participatory groups, operates on consensus process. I had been involved in the DC IMC

for more than a year at this point and I was beginning to become disillusioned with the

direction of the group. I often left meetings by storming out in disgust with the length of

the meetings but more importantly in frustration with the decision making process.

During this preparation, I wrote: “Why is it that consensus process seems to privilege the

collective at the expense of individuals?” By writing that question down, I began this

project and more than a year later that question retains its importance.

At the time I made that observation, I was working as a media consultant for

Free Speech TV (FSTV), an organization that collaborates with the Independent Media

Center during mass mobilizations. I wanted to allow members of the mainstream media

access to the DC IMC and FSTV during the fall meetings of the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund. Other “more radical” members of the collective thought

that the DC IMC should never allow mainstream media access to our space. There was a

contentious debate, where neither side was willing to budge, and the response was to

delay making a decision. Neither side had achieved anything. As I walked out of the

meeting I wondered why consensus process which is so democratic in theory—open

Page 3

membership, everyone participates, no hierarchies, unanimous decisions, etc.—was so

antidemocratic in practice.

As more problems began to surface—including a large-scale critique of sexism in

the DC IMC—I began to realize that consensus process is the antithesis of democracy

and that no degree of synthesis could reconcile it. When trying to explore this problem

with others involved in consensus-oriented groups, I found that through criticizing the

process I became a persona non grata. Criticizing the process, in many of my detractors’

views, was the equivalent to advocating distant representative democracy, where

participation is limited to voting every four years and writing letters to Members of

Congress. That was never my objective. Instead I wanted to evaluate the process we

were using and look for ways to improve it so that individuals, like me, would not feel

like they would have to sacrifice themselves to the collective rather than maintain a

semblance of individuality.

I had no idea, that this was an entire focus of study in political science, until I

began my research. I had no idea that the research I was doing would lead me to

conclude that consensus process can never be improved because of its many flaws. I

hope to show through democratic theory and an analysis of consensus process in practice

that consensus process is not the ideal form of participatory democracy and that

unanimity is often equivalent to tyranny. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, I

hope to show to proponents of consensus process, that there are other, better methods of

In this case, “antidemocratic” refers specifically to the DC IMC refusing to make a decision. This,

arguably, is not the usual definition of “antidemocratic.” However, when important decisions are not made,

those involved are less likely to remain in the group. With fewer people participating, democracy itself is

stifled.

Page 4

making decisions beyond a dichotomy of representative democracy vs. consensus

process.

I have a long list of people to thank for their help in this project. My housemates

at 942 Westminster St for allowing me to have another room in the house, without a rent

increase, to work and study. Specifically I would like to thank my housemates, Karen

Zamperini, Jill Blankespoor and Alexis Rodich who read various sections of this paper

and offered needed advice. Two other housemates, Christopher Strohm and Alan

Bushnell, who are both active members of the DC IMC, deserve recognition for allowing

me to bounce ideas off of them for the past year, even though they didn’t always agree

with me.

I also thank Adam Eidinger, who believed in my work enough to keep me on as

an Associate with the Mintwood Media Collective and run his political campaign,

although I spent vastly more time on this project as it reached its final phase. I thank him

specifically for never criticizing my priorities and being a great friend.

Some fellow “webbloggers” also deserve praise. Joanne McNeil, an incredibly

talented economist and writer, encouraged me to begin “blogging” which became

incredibly useful as I developed my final arguments. Chuck Munson, who believes

strongly in the importance of consensus process, provided useful criticism and

observations on my developing arguments, which forced me to evaluate my concluding

thoughts. Julian Sanchez, by mentioning this project on his famous weblog gave my work

more credibility than it deserved at the time and opened up many libertarians to my

analysis.

Page 5

Two people in particular deserve special recognition: Joshua Davis and Professor

Samuel Chambers. Josh, a profound and talented journalist, read most of this work,

commenting extensively on the grammar, tone and flow. Since he is not a political

scientist, his feedback helped me tone down the overly academic portions of this project

and tailor it to a more diverse audience. I cannot thank him enough for listening to my

jargon for hours on end and providing encouragement and reassurance at the most

difficult times.

Similarly, I cannot thank Professor Chambers enough for all the help he provided.

He forced me to restructure this project from a personal rant on my own observations to

something that is more informative and more useful to political theory. He forced me to

read texts that I was scared of approaching and encouraged me to think critically about

what I was reading. In addition to making this a better project, it has also made me a

better person. His feedback on every chapter was extremely useful: from correcting my

grammar to evaluating my sometimes-convoluted logic. I do not think that it is

overstating his contributions by stating that this project would be utterly useless without

his help.

Finally, I dedicate this project to everyone associated with the Washington, DC

Independent Media Center. The DC IMC was the inspiration for this project and although

many people initially rejected my argument and alienated me, others were supportive and

thankful. At the very least, people from the DC IMC, like Joanie Y and Eddie Becker,

listened to my developing argument and encouraged me to continue working. This

project is for all of you in hope that someday the DC IMC and other radical participatory

Page 6

groups will become more participatory and more democratic. That is the most radical

thing, you all can do.

Page 7

Chapter 1: Participatory and Deliberative Democracy

It has become passé to state that American democracy is faltering. It is

unnecessary to read Robert Putnam’s popular analysis of the decline in American civic

participation to see this: the statistics on voter participation are far more telling.

According to the Center for Voting and Democracy, voter turnout in 1996 was at 49%

and in 2000 at 51%.

That means roughly half of the American electorate failed to

participate in the crucial presidential elections. However, it is not that simple.

Presidential candidates attempt to speak to “the people” in order to win votes; in our

representative system “the people” theoretically “speak” through their elected members

of Congress. In 2000 there were 156,421,311 registered voters, but only 97,414,777

bothered to cast a vote for their U.S. Representative in Congress.

The millions of other

Americans were silent. It may be passé to say it, but there is something wrong with

American democracy.

The Blame Game: Structural Deficiencies in American Democracy

There are at least two ways of approaching an analysis of the decline of American

democracy. One is to look at the steadily declining voter participation statistics and place

the blame on some recent phenomenon such as television or the media. The other is to

look at the structure of American democracy and find that participation was limited when

the Constitution was implemented.

It is important to note that voter participation is not the only way to gauge American political

participation. There are other mechanisms including participation in new social movements, other forms of

protesting, writing letters to the editor, etc. However, since the legislative branch is intended to represent

the views of the people, when fewer people vote in elections, it can be said that participation has dropped.

Center for Voting and Democracy, found at http://www.fairvote.org/turnout/preturn.htm.

The number of registered voters comes from the Federal Election Commission, found at

http://www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout. The number of people actually casting a vote for their

Representative in Congress comes from the Center for Voting and Democracy, found at

www.fairvote.org/turnout/congressionaldist.htm.

Page 8

Although both Putnam and Fishkin hold modern developments responsible for the

decline in civic participation, they have varying ideas of which modern problem is at

fault. Unlike Putnam, who nearly blames everything on television

, Fishkin has a more

refined view—holding the American media at least partially responsible for the growing

disinterest in participation. Fishkin looks at studies completed by Kiku Adato and Daniel

C. Hallin on the shrinking amount of time allotted to presidential candidate soundbites

over a 20-year period from 1968 to 1988.

Television itself cannot be completely at fault

because at its early stages—even in 1968—people were still voting. However, as the

soundbites shrunk from 42 seconds to only 9 seconds, voting decreased significantly.

He concluded that, “the effective political discourse reaching the mass public continues

to be mostly the shrinking soundbite, a medium that reduces political debate to messages

worthy of bumper stickers or fortune cookies.”

Later, he details how the media’s

coverage of candidates’ debates is limited mostly to “conflict, controversy, or

confrontation”

not substantive issues. With so little time allotted to how the candidates

feel about important issues, the people feel that they do not have enough information to

make an informed choice between the candidates. Therefore, they are unlikely to vote in

an election, which as I will show below, has the potential to undermine representative

democracy.

Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, (New York: Simon &

Schuster, 2000), 192 and 216-246. “Americans at the end of the twentieth century were watching more

TV…and watching more programs that were associated specifically with civic disengagement

(entertainment, as distinct from news.)” 246.

James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform,” (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1991), 109.

Ibid.

Ibid., 109-110.

Ibid., 110.

Page 9

Like most theorists blaming modern phenomena, Fishkin’s conclusion is too

simplistic to be fully accurate. The media may be partially responsible for declining

participation, but American democracy was not created to facilitate full participation to

begin with. In other words, blaming a modern phenomenon is only looking at a small

segment of the much larger problem. In order to understand why so many theorists are

writing on “participatory democracy” one must look at structural deficiencies in

American democracy. Two theorists, Barber and Honig, look at these structural

deficiencies. They argue that the structure of American democracy limits participation.

Increasing participation, following their analysis, requires drastic reform.

Barber argues that the decline in civic participation is not emblematic of

modernity. Instead it is caused by liberalism and its creation, representative democracy.

Barber defines representative democracy “...as a form of government in which some of

the people, chosen by all, govern in all public matters all of the time.”

Therefore, the

people who chose, usually by voting, have little to no involvement in the actual

governing.

Their participation is limited only to periodic trips to the polling place.

Representative democracy is ingrained into the American system through the

Constitution.

James Madison in Federalist No. 10 detailed how a representative

democracy was vastly superior to direct democracy.

Specifically, Madison states,

[The] first difference is on the one hand to refine and enlarge the public views, by

passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom

Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, (Berkeley: University of

California, 1984), xxii. Referred to below as Strong Democracy.

Strong Democracy, xxii. Barber states: “The approach purchased efficiency without sacrificing

accountability, but it did so at an enormous cost to participation and to citizenship.”

Professor Chambers reminded me that the Constitution does not specify the exact type of representation.

That is, the Constitution does not state that a reform like turning toward Proportional Representation can

not be implemented. Groups like the Center for Voting and Democracy are actively promoting changing

from Single Member Districts to Proportional Representation.

Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, 17.

Page 10

may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love

of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial

considerations.

According to Fishkin, Madison’s argument was based on the idea “that in an extended

republic, tyranny of the majority will be less likely than in a small, direct democracy,

where the passions of the people can be immediately aroused.”

However, Madison

expresses more than just a fear of tyranny of the majority. By favoring a “patriotic” and

wise elite over an unrefined American public, he explicitly rejects the decision-making

capabilities of average Americans. But, using Madison’s logic against him, the American

public has to be refined, wise, and patriotic enough to vote for representatives who are

the most “patriotic” and have the greatest amount of “love for justice.” In a representative

system, the American voters “discern the true interest of the country” by voting for their

representatives. However, in order for representative democracy to work, the people have

to choose their representatives. In recent years, the people are not even choosing. This is

because there is another structural deficiency at play.

Following the 2000 presidential election fiasco, Bonnie Honig provided another

analysis of why American democracy is not reaching its potential. Through a series of

pointed questions, Honig’s essay, “Dead Rights, Live Futures: A Reply to Habermas’s

‘Constitutional Democracy,” presents the argument that because the Constitution is a

historical document, in the present-day people’s democratic agency is bound by a

document they did not produce.

She addresses the problem with having “both the rule

James Madison, Federalist No. 10, 47.

Democracy and Deliberation, 17.

Bonnie Honig, “Dead Rights, Live Futures: A Reply to Habermas’s ‘Constitutional Democracy,’”

Political Theory, 795. Honig asks, “In what sense can the people be said to have free authorship if they are

required to approach the constitution as their forebears did, with the same standards and from the same

perspective, even if also permittedly, ‘in a critical fashion?’ ... “In what sense can they be said to be

Page 11

of law and the rule of the people”—as well as Habermas’ co-originality thesis which

argues that both the rule of law and the rule of the people developed “simultaneously”

and depend on one another for legitimation.

Honig argues that some Constitutions deny

democratic agency, which is necessary for real democratic practice.

By placing herself

within the historical context of the 2000 presidential election, where the Supreme

Court—not the voters—ultimately decided the election results, Honig’s interpretation of

constitutionalism is directly related to participatory democracy. Especially, in the

conclusion of her essay when she describes the “notwithstanding clause” of the Canadian

constitution, which “allows provinces to opt out of constitutionally binding decisions for

five years, subject to local majority approval.”

That is, the Canadian constitution allows

privileges the people over the law itself—allowing for more participatory democracy.

Honig admits she is not the only contemporary theorist writing on the problems of

constitutionalism and democracy. Barber addresses this issue, somewhat more clearly, in

his essay “Does Democracy need Foundations?” His answer is definitively “no,” because

even countries with long-standing constitutions require “spontaneity, flexibility,

autonomy and commonality,”

to experience democracy fully. These concepts are not

generally associated with the rigid structure explicitly written into most constitutions,

creating the potential for conflict with people who want to change their constitution.

Barber responds by stating that even within a government ruled by a constitution, people

still have to have democratic agency. “Democracy is for the living, and the living are

politically free if they understand themselves to be bound to a progressive temporality in and out of which

constitutional democracy in its full, unconflicted expression is required to unfold.”

Ibid, 793.

Ibid, 800-801.

Ibid., 801.

Benjamin Barber, “Does Democracy Need Foundations?” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the

Boundaries of the Political,” 355.

Page 12

always democratically empowered to change their founding democratic constitution.”

In other words, if people find that their democratic constitution is constraining, they can

and should use democracy to unbind themselves.

Following this analysis, if people find

that the United States Constitution is constraining their democratic participation, they

must participate in actions to change the Constitution to allow it to encourage greater

participation. For example, if the problem is that the constitution’s representative system

only allows for people to participate in the system by voting for representatives, then they

should vote for representatives that will struggle to change the constitution to allow for

more diverse forms of participation.

A more participatory system is one that would encourage more diverse forms of

engaging in democracy. However it is important to understand that not all

“participatory” systems are democratic. Some, such as consensus process, are more

problematic for democracy in the long term than a lackluster voter turnout.

Others—notably Iris Marion Young’s conception of “communicative

democracy”—provide a useful outline for what a truly participatory democracy would

look like. This chapter then has two goals: to analyze various theories of “participatory

democracy” and to provide a theoretical critique of consensus process.

Rousseau and the Social Contract: Exploring Possible Solutions

When I began this project, my central worry vis-à-vis consensus process was

simple: individual concerns and goals were almost always sacrificed to the collective.

That is, the decision making structure—voting by unanimous consent—does not allow

for individuals to object to the growing “consensus” of the group. Minority rights have no

Ibid., 356.

Page 13

place in a consensus process based system. This is why I disagree so fervently with Jean-

Jacques Rousseau, whose concept of democracy is similar to consensus process because

it centers on the community and implies unanimity. By focusing on the community,

Rousseau was also interested in individual rights versus the collective; however, his

conclusion is:

to find a form of association which will defend the person and goods of each

member with the collective force of all, and under which each individual, which

uniting himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as

before.

His “solution” is to endorse the collective over the individual through the social contract;

however Rousseau argues that merging the individual with the collective will provide for

the retention of individual rights and equality for everyone.

His interpretation of

equality does not have positive connotations; when one gives over his rights to the

community, equality is achieved only because “it is in no one’s interest to make the

conditions onerous for others.”

In other words, people are equal only because it would

be detrimental to the community if there were any sort of hierarchy.

Rousseau sees the state of nature as the absence of a common judge, much like

Locke.

Rousseau claims that unless individuals give up all rights to the collective, they

will still demand the right to judge others, which would either nullify the social contract

or create tyranny.

The loss of individual rights is problematic; however, Rousseau

Ibid.,357. Barber states, “...democracy produces itself. Democracy is the regime within which the

struggle for democracy finds legitimacy.”

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 60.

Ibid.,60.

Ibid.

Ibid, 61.

Ibid.

Page 14

claims that that loss is nominal in comparison with what he gains.

“What man loses by

thee social contract is his natural liberty and the absolute right to anything that temps him

and that he can take; what he gains by the social contract is civil liberty and the legal

right of property in what he possesses.” Civil liberties, in Rousseau’s social contract, are

bound by the “general will”

—a concept that makes Rousseau’s social contract theory

participatory, but also highly anti-democratic.

Rousseau, like other participatory democracy theorists, denounces representative

democracy. He states that, “...the moment a people adopts representatives it is no longer

free; it no longer exists.”

Instead he offers a scheme where authority rests in the

“general will” which is defined as “the will of the body of the people” and “an act of

sovereignty [which] constitutes law.”

Since those definitions are vague, Rousseau

offers a more structured account of how the general will is obtained.

From the deliberations of a people properly informed, provided its members do

not have any communication among themselves, the great number of small

differences will always produce a general will and the decision will always be

good.

Therefore, for something to constitute the general will, people must be educated enough

to understand the issues, they must talk to one another; however, they must not develop

factions.

At face value, it appears that Rousseau is advocating unanimity; however,

Ibid.,64-65. Rousseau states later “instead of alienation, they have profitably exchanged an uncertain and

precarious life for a better and more secure one; they have exchanged natural independence for freedom,

the power to injure others for the enjoyment of their own security; they have exchanged their own strength

which others might overcome for a right which the social union makes invincible,” 77.

Ibid, 65.

Ibid.,143. Barber also mentions this in Strong Democracy adding, “Representation is incompatible with

freedom because it delegates and thus alienates political will at the cost of genuine self government and

autonomy.” 145.

Ibid.,70.

Ibid., 73.

Ibid.

Page 15

in a footnote he states: “for the will to be general, it does not have to be unanimous; but

all the votes, must be counted. Any formal exclusion destroys its universality.”

Rousseau further complicates the general will by stating that “the general will…should

spring from all for it to apply to all…” implying unanimity.

Rousseau’s version of participatory democracy has been largely criticized as,

“simultaneously providing the origins of democracy and the origins of totalitarianism,

[because] under the general will everyone is equal, but the government also has unlimited

power.”

Barber rejects Rousseau’s social contract theory because, “in subordinating

participation in a greater whole to identification with that whole and autonomy and self-

legislation to unity and group self-realization, unitary democracy becomes conformist,

collectivist, and often even coercive.”

Additionally, Barber notes, because Rousseau’s

theory is so well known critics often reject participatory democracy outright leaving no

room for alternatives.

[They] generally envision only one ideal type of pure democracy, which is then

made to embrace such distinct variants as participationism, majoritarian tyranny,

consensualism, totalism, communitarianism, and various theories of the General

Will. ... Direct democratic strategies are thus made guilty by association and

dismissed as imprudent, risky to freedom or worse.

This is particularly problematic because it justifies continuing with the status quo of a

specific configuration of representative democracy with only limited participation.

However, luckily for those who agree with Rousseau that representative democracy is

faulty, there are other theories of participatory democracy.

Ibid.,70.

Ibid., 75.

Jack R. Censer and Lynn Hunt, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity: Exploring the French Revolution,

(University Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 37.

Strong Democracy, 148.

Ibid.,96.

Page 16

Barber: An Alternative Participatory Democracy?

While incessantly stressing the differences between his conception of democracy

and Rousseau’s unitary democracy, Barber provides one of the most complete plans for a

more participatory democracy. Barber’s Strong Democracy is a thorough critique of

false “democracies;” but it is also a solution-oriented agenda for creating real

democracies. One of the key differences between Rousseau, representative democracy

and Barber’s conception of strong democracy is the relationship between community and

participation.

Rousseau idealizes community and limits the degree one can participate in a

government oriented toward the general will; there are no individual rights and there can

be no factions. Representative democracies, on the other hand, value limited participation

(namely, the vote) and degrade community to pluralist interest groups and congressional

boundary lines. Barber thoughtfully states that neither community without participation

nor participation without community is acceptable. “Community without participation

merely rationalizes collectivism, giving it an aura of legitimacy. Participation without

community merely rationalizes individualism, giving it the aura of democracy.”

Barber’s strong democracy, on the other hand, links the two concepts through

“citizenship”

and writes of their relationship: “Community grows out of participation

and at the same time makes participation possible.”

Merely redefining the term “citizenship” is not Barber’s main objective. His real

goals are noted in a12-point plan for creating a more participatory democracy. This plan

includes “neighborhood assemblies” with “local legislative competence,” “informal lay

Ibid.

Page 17

justice,” “a national initiative and referendum process...on congressional legislation,” and

“universal citizen service.”

This plan, in full, provides people with more opportunities

to be engaged in their communities and more chances to participate in politics. While on

the one hand Barber’s strong democracy is the practical application of the merging of

participation and community into the greater concept of citizenship, on the other hand it

creates possible openings for tyranny.

First, Barber’s plan includes delegating some legislative power to neighborhood

assemblies. He describes these groups as “extragovernmental bodies [that] sprung up in

middle-class urban neighborhoods” that “[originated] in a concern over crime.”

What

he fails to mention here is that these neighborhoods, particularly those with in gated

communities were often highly discriminatory and had written covenants preventing

certain racial, ethnic or religious groups from living within them.

Providing

neighborhood groups with full legislative power would only increase neighborhood

segregation. Barber acknowledges this problem later when briefly discussing

neighborhood schools.

The neighborhood school may harbor racism and be a monument to

parochialism—which is why voucher advocates oppose it—but it also endows a

community with a heart and gives youngsters their first inkling of what it means

to be a neighbor and a citizen.

Neither a school nor a community that “harbors racism” teaches children how to be good

neighbors and good citizens. However, this is not Barber’s main point. His focus is on

encouraging participation and people are more likely to participate if they have a personal

Ibid.,152.

Ibid.,307.

Ibid., 269.

Page 18

connection or concern with a situation. Participation can be effective without being

endowed with full legislative ability, which is where the potential problems lie. For

example, several public schools in DC are operating at below 50% capacity; however, the

communities surrounding them have taken an active role in making sure that the schools

remain open.

These community advocates are avoiding harboring racism and are

participating in democracy without having full legislative power.

Another problem with Barber’s concept of strong democracy is his advocacy for

an experiment in “informal lay justice by an engaged local citizenry.”

Unfortunately,

Barber never fully describes how informal lay justice would operate, however it can be

taken to mean that community members would have the capacity to convict and

determine sentences for “criminals” within the community. Barber may criticize

Rousseau for advocating a “false democracy;” however, it is hard to see how “informal

lay justice” is democratic when paired with the neighborhood assemblies with legislative

power. Neighborhoods often have their own sets of covenants and rules, with “informal

lay justice” powerful groups within the neighborhoods could arbitrarily enforce those

rules and target minority groups. It is not very difficult to see how “informal lay justice”

could lead to vigilantism, although Barber pretends to think that the local police could

prevent that from happening.

Local police, however, are often understaffed and busy

with other, more pressing, concerns to effectively prevent vigilantism.

Interview with Candace Sullivan, who worked to desegregate gated communities in the 1970s. Summer

2000.

Ibid., 306.

Interview with Karen Zamperini, a federal contractor with the Army Corps of Engineers working in the

District of Columbia Public School system. October, 2002.

Ibid., 307.

Ibid., 304.

Page 19

There are many aspects of Barber’s strong democracy that provide hope for those

that want to see a more participatory democracy. For one, he emphasizes the importance

of “strong democratic talk” which encompasses listening. This is vastly different from a

representative system where, “it is far easier for representatives to speak for us than to

listen for us.”

Barber’s conception of strong democratic talk is more complex and is

more multifaceted. It ranges from “the articulation of interests; bargaining and

exchange” to “community-building as the creation of public interests, common goods,

and active citizens.”

While “strong democratic talk” sounds nice, it is only one part of

Barber’s overall program. Since, that program includes at least two problematic

parts—neighborhood assemblies with legislative power and informal lay justice—his

strong democracy proposal must be rejected, or at least highly modified.

Fishkin: Failed Experiments in Deliberative Democracy

Both Barber and Fishkin advocate using interactive technology which would

allow for greater forms of participation, such as immediate voting on a referendum at

home.

Fishkin, however, stresses that while this technology allows for greater

participation it may not always be democratic.

“If a simple vote of mass publics after

the nightly news were the only prerequisite for new legislation, there would be few

impediments to tyranny of the majority once the public was aroused.”

This type of

tyranny of the majority would violate Fishkin’s concept of political equality, which is

necessary for democracy to function effectively. He defines “political equality” as a

Ibid.,174.

Ibid.,178-179.

Ibid.,275. see also Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, 21. In both of these sections, they talk about

the Warner-Amex Qube, which according to Fishkin is “a television system that enables people to vote in

their homes.” 21.

His substantive argument appears much later, when he notes that he prizes deliberation over

participation, 53.

Page 20

three-step process: “formal equality granting equal weight to people’s preferences,”

“guarantees that the political process has not been interfered with by irrelevant factors,”

and “adequate opportunities for voters to form preferences.”

The evening news may

emphasize only one side of the issue perhaps preferring the side that gives more

advertising money. Additionally, an immediate vote after the evening news does not give

the public enough time to deliberate on the issue.

Acknowledging these problems, Fishkin argues for a representative sampling

system or a method of what he calls, “deliberative opinion polls.”

These polls would be

conducted with small groups that meet face-to-face and “will be expected to come to their

decisions through mutual discussion and debate.”

This seems like an effective way to

avoid the tyranny of the majority scenario that Fishkin earlier feared.

Fishkin states that, “deliberative opinion polls offer direct democracy among a

group of politically equal participants who, as a microcosm of the society, represent or

stand for the deliberations of the whole.”

There is a catch, though. Those “politically

equal participants” must have a certain degree of education and skills to have the ability

to deliberate effectively.

Fishkin attempts to substantiate his argument by showing that

through deliberation, people become more “knowledgeable and sophisticated.”

However, as he states later, it is “utopian” to believe that “the mass public can become

deliberative” which is why he proposes the deliberative opinion poll.

Ibid., 21.

Ibid., 31.

Ibid., 22-23.

Ibid., 93.

Ibid.

Ibid., 31.

Ibid., 84.

Ibid.

Page 21

Ultimately, although Fishkin is critical of the current American system, his

“deliberative opinion poll” proposal does not create a more participatory democracy. It

only creates a mechanism where the selected individuals discuss possible solutions to

contentious current issues. It may be a decent short-term solution to the lack of

deliberation in the mass media; however, it is unlikely to increase overall participation.

Participation increases when people have a direct connection to a problem, as in the

earlier example of community advocates fighting the closure of their neighborhood

schools. Participation does not increase simply because a selected group of people

discuss issues.

Unanimity and Minority Rights: Consensus Process vs. Other Options for a More

Participatory Democracy

Fishkin and Barber both examine types of participatory and deliberative

democracy; however, neither offers particularly viable solutions. There is another

example of a form of democracy that is both somewhat participatory and somewhat

deliberative. It is known as consensus process. While others have referred to what I

know as consensus process as unitary democracy, the term consensus process is a far

better description of both the theoretical and the practical aspects of this type of

“democracy.” My working definition of consensus process is a form of participatory

democracy centered on deliberation, where the final decision is unanimous. In the next

chapter, I will discuss the practical problems of using consensus process. Below I will

discuss four theoretical problems of consensus process: why unanimity is an unrealistic

goal, why minority rights are stifled, why there is a “choice” of coercion or the status quo

in decision making, and why conflict is avoided.

Page 22

One of the most important attributes of consensus process is that decisions must

be unanimous—that is, every member of the collective must agree to the final

decision—in order for it to be instituted as policy. Generally speaking, this requires

homogeneity, as alternative perspectives do not lend themselves to unanimous decisions.

While I will discuss how this is problematic from a practical perspective later, the goal of

unanimity is also difficult to support from a theoretical angle.

Although he dismisses Locke’s argument against unanimity as “commonplace,”

Sheldon Wolin uses Locke’s language and logic to argue against unanimity.

Wolin

writes, “Unanimity is an impossible basis of action because ‘the Infirmities of Health and

Avocations of Business...will necessarily keep many away from the publick

Assembly.’”

As “commonplace” as this may be, it was Locke’s basis for rejecting

unanimous decision making in favor of majority rule. In any group, important decisions

must be made in a timely manner; waiting until every member of the community is

present to take a vote simply is impractical. Furthermore, for Locke, the implications for

choosing a consensus based decision-making scheme over majority rule are even more

drastic. Locke argues that if a community does not use majority rule, “they can not act as

one body, and consequently [the community] will be immediately dissolved.”

Therefore, unanimity is not just impractical it is also highly problematic. Seyla

Benhabib argues that in most “radical participatory democratic theories” the goal of

Sheldon S. Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of

the Political ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 40. Below I

will refer to the book itself as Democracy and Difference. Wolin later tries to legitimate homogeneity by

“reinterpreting” it as solidarity. (44) I find this rationale, useless and misguided; however, I have already

written at length about solidarity in my December 2001 essay “Shared Hope: Solidarity in the Anti-

Corporate Globalization Movement.”

Ibid., 40.

John Locke, “Second Treatise on Civil Government,” in Social Contract, (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1962), 58.

Page 23

unanimity “silences dissent [while] curtailing minority viewpoints.”

Silencing dissent

means limiting participation. Curtailing minority viewpoints means stifling deliberation.

Following Benhabib’s analysis here, it is hard to see how consensus process is either

participatory or deliberative since it explicitly advocates unanimity as a goal.

Benhabib is not the only author to reject unanimity. Chantal Mouffe states that

unanimity and its related concept, homogeneity, are “fictitious and based on acts of

exclusion.”

Unlike Benhabib, Mouffe does not explicitly state that she favors majority

rule. Instead, she argues that only through embracing pluralism—which she defines as

“the end of the substantive idea of the good life”—can one experience democracy.

Putting her larger proposal aside, her strongest argument against proponents of a

consensus-like process is that “conflicts and confrontations” are necessary for democracy

to function.

I will address the importance of conflict more completely later; however, at

this point it is important to note that the goal of unanimity implies a lack of conflict.

I have shown that unanimity and its sister concept homogeneity are hoaxes. Since

unanimity is the ultimate goal of all political discourse in consensus process, showing

that unanimity is unrealistic largely delegitmates the process itself. However, consensus

process is more than just the process of voting on policies. As a so-called participatory

and deliberative democracy, there is a period of debate before there is consent on an

issue. During this debate period, an important problem arises: Since the ultimate goal of

consensus is unanimity, what happens to those who disagree with the policy?

Selya Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy” in Democracy and

Difference, 77.

Ibid.

Chantal Mouffe, “Democracy, Power and the Political,” in Democracy and Difference, 246.

Ibid.

Ibid., 255.

Page 24

Jane J. Mansbridge discusses this problem best in her book, Beyond Adversary

Democracy. She writes:

In a consensual system, the minority is, in a sense eliminated. ...Its objections go

unrecorded. Indeed, if those in the minority are intimidated, cannot give their

reasons convincingly, or do not care enough to make a scene, they may never

voice their objections.

Obviously the lack of minority rights is a problem because it creates an atmosphere in

which consensus is contrived not deliberated upon. Without the inclusion of minority

viewpoints, consensus process is participatory for only those that agree with the majority

opinion during the deliberation period itself. Carol Gould, in criticizing Habermas,

makes a similar observation.

“There are, for example, those who do not or cannot

speak in public, who from inarticulateness, fear, habit or oppression are removed from

participation in public life.”

A problem like this casts doubt on the potential for any

deliberative democracy to be effective; however, Iris Marion Young claims that this is

not necessarily the case and offers a few important solutions to encourage greater

participation and fuller deliberation.

Young states that often those in the minority in a deliberative democracy, such as

consensus process are those that are minorities to begin with. She argues that these

groups are excluded from full participation because proponents of consensus process

ignore their speech patterns.

In many formal situations the better-educated white middle-class people,

moreover, often act as though they have the right to speak and that their words

Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 170.

Referred to below as Beyond Adversary Democracy.

Carol C. Gould, “Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences,” in Democracy and Difference,

174. She states that there is a difficulty “with respect to Habermas’s characterization of discourse as having

a built-in criterion of consensus as its ultimate and ongoing aim. Not only does the discussion aim at

agreement, it aims at the total agreement of all those who could possibly be affected by the adoption of the

norm that is the object of the agreement.”

Ibid., 175-176.

Page 25

carry authority, whereas those of other groups often feel intimidated by the

argument requirements and the formality of rules of parliamentary procedure, so

they don’t speak, or speak only in a way that those in charge find “disruptive.”

With this in mind, Young rejects deliberative democracy—which she suggests, “assumes

unity”—in favor of “communicative democracy.”

The importance of this articulation of

“communicative democracy” will be fully explored later in Chapter 3.

Consensus Process and Conflict: Stagnation or Manipulation

Dealing with conflicts within the debate and decision making process illustrates

another problem with consensus process. On a superficial level consensus process

attempts to alleviate all conflicts through an appeal to unanimity. In one of his more

poignant moments Barber shows how ridiculous this is: “the paradox of consensus

remains: if one claims that the condition of unanimity and consensus that politics wishes

to achieve by art already exists by nature, then politics loses its purpose and becomes

superfluous.”

In other words, conflict is necessary for politics. And it is especially

necessary for democracy. Conflict attracts attention to important issues and is often a pre-

cursor to change. Conflict encourages participation. Conflict encourages deliberation.

Although consensus process may strive to avoid conflict, tension arises during

deliberation and it must be resolved. With the goal of unanimity in mind, conflict in

consensus process leads to manipulation or stagnation, not participation and deliberation.

Iris Marion Young, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,” in Democracy

and Difference, 124. I will explore this concept, in greater depth from a practical perspective in the next

chapter.

Ibid., 132. “The ideal of communicative democracy includes more than deliberative democracy, because

it recognizes that when political dialogue aims at solving collective problems, it justly requires a plurality

of perspectives, speaking styles, and ways of expressing the particularity of social situations as well as the

general applicability of principles,” 132.

Strong Democracy, 128.

Ibid. An example of this in action: highly contested political races. People are more interested in

knowing the issues that separate the candidates and more interested in voting, if there is intense conflict.

The recent Maryland gubernatorial debate between U.S. Representative Robert Ehrlich and Lt. Governor

Page 26

Mansbridge accurately describes this problem when she states: “When individual

interests are in irresolvable conflict, a consensus requirement guarantees either deadlock

in favor of the status quo or social pressure on dissenters to go along.”

In other words,

although advocates of consensus process claim that it is a participatory democracy there

is a great deal of manipulation or “social coercion” involved in the decision making

experience.

In a later essay, Mansbridge attempts to legitimate coercion as necessary

for democracies to survive. She argues “democracies need coercion primarily to take

action without overly privileging the status quo.”

This assessment stems from an

acknowledgement that sometimes people cannot agree, even through deliberation.

Therefore, in order to avoid stagnation, democracy must “act, by coercing some to go

along with the others.”

She claims, legitimately, that unanimity privileges the status

quo, those that want change—particularly those from minority groups—must be willing

and able to coerce others.

In the same article, Mansbridge argues another side and proposes that

“oppositional discourses and oppositional cultures” must challenge coercion because it is

never fully legitimate.

This addendum makes Mansbridge’s argument more palatable.

However, it does not erase the earlier claim that groups using consensus process have to

select from two poor choices—stagnation or manipulation—in decision making. As I

will show later in Chapter 2, when an oppositional discourse challenges the coercion

implicit in consensus process, the only other option is to return to the status quo. Put

Kathleen Kennedy Townsend is a fabulous example of conflict between candidates garnering extensive

coverage and interest.

Beyond Adversary Democracy, 31-32.

Ibid., 201.

Jane Mansbridge, “Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity,” in Democracy and Difference, 47.

Ibid.

Ibid., 48 and 56.

Page 27

simply, when conflict exists, consensus process does not allow a third way that could

provide a method of shifting policy without manipulating some members of the polity.

A Real Participatory and Deliberative Democracy?

Since consensus process, stifles dissent, injures minorities, and sets up a

dichotomy of stagnation or manipulation when conflict arises, there appears to be no

substantive reason to call it participatory, deliberative or democratic, even in theory.

Why then are so many radical participatory groups using it as a governing structure when

other truly participatory and deliberative possibilities exist?

Arguably, these radical participatory groups want to veer so far away from

hierarchical structure of representative democracy so a process that values participation

and strives for a collective spirit proves appealing. However, appealing as it may be, it

does not work. The participation is limited and the collective spirit represents exactly

what Madison feared. It is the epitome of tyranny of the majority as minorities are

almost completely prevented from both participating and deliberating in the process.

These radical participatory groups should reject consensus process altogether and look

elsewhere.

While I will discuss alternatives to consensus process in depth in Chapter 3, the

simplest alternative is similar to what Benhabib proposes—a deliberative democracy that

ends in a vote along the guidelines of majority rule. In rejecting consensus process,

Joshua Cohen expresses how this could work.

...Even an ideal deliberative procedure will not, in general, produce consensus.

But even if there is disagreement, and the decision is made by majority rule,

participants may appeal to considerations that are quite generally recognized as

having considerable weight, and as a suitable basis for collective choice, even

among people who disagree about the right result: when participants confine their

Ibid., 59-60.

Page 28

argument to such reasons, majority support itself will commonly could as reason

for accepting the decision as legitimate.

This is a solid and reasonable alternative to consensus process because it not only

envisions a decision making process that is less problematic than consensus process, but

it additionally fends off attacks of illegitimacy. I want to stress that voting by majority

rule does not make the process more deliberative or even necessarily more participatory.

After all, representatives vote by majority rule and rarely provide ample time for

deliberation. However, majority rule does not explicitly exclude minority perspectives as

the unanimity-centered consensus process does.

Furthermore, as shown above, merely allowing for deliberation does not mean

every voice is heard and valued. I agree that alternative modes of speech must be allowed

into the political discourse in order for any democracy to be deliberative. I have briefly

noted Young’s analysis that the process of deliberation often privileges certain types of

speech and thus alienates many political participants. While I will discuss her scenario for

encouraging more diverse speech during deliberation in depth in Chapter 3, I will note

now that it is necessary to reduce that privilege in order to have a system where the

democratic process is more deliberative and participatory. It should be instituted to save

American democracy.

Joshua Cohen, “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy,” in Democracy and Difference,

100.

Page 29

Chapter 2: Practical Consensus?

Ten people are sitting in a circle discussing finding an office for the small group

of which they are all members. People raise their hands calmly and wait for their chance

to speak. The meeting chairperson, known as a facilitator, calls on those individuals one

by one. The discussion is fast-paced with each individual’s comment building upon the

comments of the speaker before. After about 10 minutes, the group unanimously decides

to delegate its power to three individuals who will contact property owners they know

and ask about the cost of renting an office space. They agree to return to the group at the

next meeting to present their results. The meeting adjourns. This is a true story of a

recent meeting of the DC Independent Media Center and it represents the ideal of small

group consensus process—a form of decision-making where everyone participates and

decisions are made unanimously. However, consensus process does not always work as

this way.

In the previous chapter, I evaluated several major theoretical problems with

consensus process: the problem of minority rights in relation to unanimity, the “choice”

of coercion or the status quo in decision making, and the role of conflict in politics. My

goal in this chapter is to show how consensus process in practice often elucidates many

of these theoretical problems. Through the definition of “membership” to the agenda

setting process to actual debate and decision-making, consensus process in practice is just

as manipulative, hierarchical and anti-deliberative as many theorists have proposed.

A Description of Consensus Process

Before analyzing the problems within many facets of consensus process it is

important to have an idea of how a meeting operates. The best brief interpretation of

Page 30

consensus process comes from a chart created by Saint and Lawson, which I have only

slightly revised.

Preconsensus: 1) Determine group membership, 2) Understand the meaning of

consensus, 3) Agree on group purpose, 4) Set standards for interpersonal

behavior.

Stage 1: 1) State the proposal, 2) Clarify the proposal, 3) State concerns, 4) 1

call

for consensus (read: unanimous decision)…if no consensus…

Stage 2: 1) List all concerns, 2) Resolve concerns, 3) 2

call for consensus, 4)

Evaluate group purpose and values, 5) 3

call for consensus, 6) Evaluate

individual motives, 7) Final call for consensus…if no consensus…

Stage 3: 1) Contract for more time, 2) Presenter withdraws proposal, 3)

Concerned members withdraw or stand aside, 4) Conduct straw poll, 5) Send

proposal to a subgroup, 6) Create community building, 7) Conduct supermajority

vote, 8) Exclude members.

Small Groups: Membership and Growth

Consensus process is used as a political organizing tool primarily for small groups,

usually with less than 50 individuals.

However, most “how-to” guides on consensus

process stress that not all small groups can use consensus. The Center for Conflict

Resolution (CCR) notes seven “group conditions that support consensus.” They are:

“unity of purpose, equal access to power, autonomy of the group from external

hierarchical structures, time, a willingness in the group to attend to process, a willingness

Stephen Saint and James R. Lawson, Rules for Reaching Consensus: A Modern Approach to Decision

Making (San Diego: Pfeiffer & Company, 1994) unnumbered page directly preceding page 1. Referred to

below as: Rules for Reaching Consensus.

Page 31

in the group to attend to attitudes and a willingness in the group to learn and practice

skills.”

The CCR argues that groups that attempt to use consensus process without these

conditions will fail.

For example, because most workplaces and organizations do not

live in a bubble where power structures or hierarchies do not exist, they are excluded

from using consensus process. Many groups also do not have endless amounts of time

that they can spend debating an issue. The only groups able to reach consensus on a

regular basis, Mansbridge argues, are groups of friends because they hold “total respect”

for each other and “have common interests.”

These groups of friends immediately

uphold several of the characteristics CCR calls require for consensus to work: friendship

is nonhierarchical and friends are more likely to listen closely to each other. However,

even with groups comprised of close friends, many of the negative characteristics of

consensus process still appear.

Mansbridge notes that small groups, especially groups of friends and other close

associates “promote conformity and conflict avoidance, producing surface unanimity

while masking a genuine opposition of interests.”

She relates two different accounts

that make consensus process look very similar to the interactions of a high school clique.

The first, in her study of a small town that uses consensus process, citizens of Selby

worried about the way they would be treated in everyday social affairs if they disagreed

There is a method for using consensus process with large groups. It is known as the spokescouncil model

and will be addressed below.

Center for Conflict Resolution, Building United Judgment: A Handbook for Consensus Decision Making,

(Fellowship for Intentional Community, 1981) 8-9. Referred to below as Building United Judgment.

Other books address similar conditions. For instance argue that in addition to agreeing on the group’s

purpose, the group must also “set standards for interpersonal behavior,” 24.

Beyond Adversary Democracy, 9-10.

Ibid., 282. Saint and Lawson claim that: “Consensus does not mean unanimity or 100 percent agreement

on everything by everybody. Consensus is not conformity,” 4. However, since they also write on page 70:

“We are on the threshold or a new age, a new era, a new civilization,” it is difficult to take their argument

seriously. Saint and Lawson are simply too optimistic about consensus process and the effect it could have

Page 32

with the majority in the town meeting.

The second, comes from Helpline, a non-profit

organization with multifaceted service groups, “Ruth found her friendship with her

roommate imperiled by the conflict between their two service groups; she was afraid that

her friend would never speak to her again.”

Even within groups that fit CCR and

Mansbridge’s definition of groups capable of using consensus process, the undemocratic

problems of conformity and conflict avoidance appear.

The problem of membership definition also troubles consensus process. As an

alternative to the rigidity of representative democracy, many small groups committed to

consensus are also dedicated to open membership.

Open membership is best described

by Saint and Lawson when they articulate how a group should define who can

participate. “The group should include members representing those affected by the

decision, those implementing the decision, and those supporting the implementation.”

Open membership means that anyone can walk into the meeting and immediately

participate in the decision making process—even if they do not fully understand the

process itself. This standard, altogether disregards the conditions set by CCR and

Mansbridge, as participants who feel that they are affected by the decision the group

makes, may not agree with the group’s purpose and may hinder the group from reaching

any decision. For instance, if a group declared purpose is to promote a vegan diet and

members decide that they should picket outside of a local McDonald’s because it serves

on the world as a whole. Perhaps, I am too cynical but I believe that Mansbridge, by far, has the better

analysis of consensus process as conformist and as promoting unanimity.

Ibid., 283.

Ibid.

This observation is based on my experience in the anti-corporate globalization movement where

organizing groups such as the Mobilization for Global Justice and the DC IMC announced their meetings

and encouraged “everyone” to come and participate.

Rules for Reaching, 20. This sounds very similar to Habermas’ ideal speech situation, which as I

mentioned earlier, even Fishkin criticizes as “utopian.”

Page 33

meat products, the owner of that McDonald’s will obviously be affected by the group’s

decision. If this group promotes open membership, the owner can participate in the

consensus process and refuse to agree with the majority’s decision. This would prevent

unanimity and would likely stifle the group’s ability to move ahead with its plans.

This problem, however, is not limited to small groups that have an open membership.

Groups that begin as close friends can change rapidly as new people are interested in

joining the group. This growth can create different problems, as people are less

concerned with the social implications of their actions, as in the case of Ruth above, and

more concerned with maintaining the group. Groups experiencing growth often have

problems with finding a unity of purpose as well as trusting one another.

CCR writes

that new members should “feel wanted and welcomed” but that the older members of the

group may not be able to “give them the necessary time and support.”

As Mansbridge

observes, new members of a group have less power than older members and participate

less in the process.

“Newcomers took a while to become familiar with the system of

making decisions, to gather the confidence to try to influence decisions, and to get to a

point in their work where they had the time and interest to become involved in the larger

process.”

Additionally new members may object to fundamental goals of the group

making older members consider them a “threat to group stability.”

Returning to the

vegan group scenario I proposed above, the addition of the McDonald’s owner clearly

has the potential of destabilizing the group. In a situation like this, the vegan group is

Beyond Adversary Democracy, 291.

Building United Judgment, 94.

Beyond Adversary Democracy, 187.

Ibid.

Building United Judgment, 94. After an exhausting meeting on gender issues within the DC IMC, a new

female member objected to the posting of the “Women’s List of Demands” because she had never

experienced any patriarchical behavior in the DC IMC.

Page 34

unlikely to get a unanimous decision on picketing the McDonald’s and may have to

substitute consensus process for other options.

The two possible substitutes are intensified social pressure or the institution of

adversary procedures. Many…end up using social pressure to bring minorities into

line because invoking adversary procedures would require recognizing that the nature

of their group had changed.

Groups experiencing growth, then, have the option of engaging in manipulation or

abandoning consensus process altogether thereby returning to majority rule. This choice

makes it difficult to see why consensus process is considered a “modern approach to

decision making.”

Hierarchies in Consensus Process: Agenda Setting and Assigned Roles

Consensus process is supposed to be non-hierarchical. However, in practice

determining the agenda for meetings and the assigned roles, such as a facilitator and the

“vibes watcher,” create de facto hierarchies that undermine the process itself. The first

example of problematic power structures occurs during the creation of the agenda. Saint

and Lawson write: “The agenda should be developed in advance by group members and

reviewed at the beginning of the meeting for any additions or deletions.”

100

This advance

group can determine which proposals occur in the early part of the meeting where most

people are attentive and which proposals occur at the end of the meeting where people

have started to leave or have lost interest.

101

The stringently pro-consensus process group

CCR even analyzes the potential for a hierarchy. They write, “if the whole group

participates in the ordering [of the agenda], the power and control will be distributed

Beyond Adversary Democracy, 291.

This is the subtitle of Saint and Lawson’s book Rules for Reaching Consensus.

100

Rules for Reaching Consensus, 11.

101

Building United Judgment, 42-43. Here CCR suggests several methods of creating the agenda ranging

from: “saving some big items for later on to maintain interest” to [starting] with difficult, divisive items and

[finishing] with more unifying and agreeable ones.”

Page 35

among the group.”

102

However, in practice having the entire group participate in the

agenda creation process creates a “talking about talking about” the proposals scenario,

which often wastes time, and disillusions would-be participants. Groups that choose to

operate using consensus process must choose between having a selected group create the

agenda or waste hours of potential decision-making time deciding on the order of the

agenda.

103

Another example of hierarchies in consensus process is the assigned roles group

members perform during the meeting. The two most problematic assigned roles are the

facilitator and the “vibes watcher.” The facilitator is similar to a chairperson, while the

“vibes watcher” is responsible for taking into account the emotion of the group.

104

The

roles may be different; however, both often require making value judgments that impede

the full participation that consensus process claims to uphold.

105

Regardless of the decision-making process, most groups have a chairperson who

is responsible for running the meeting. In groups that operate using majority-rule, the

chairperson is often elected to hold that position. Groups that use consensus process,

however, often have a rotating facilitator who is usually a member of the group. In

addition to running the meeting, the facilitator has many more responsibilities. “The

facilitator’s job is to support everyone to do their best thinking. To do this, the facilitator

encourages full participation, promotes mutual understanding and cultivates shared

responsibility.”

106

Although the facilitator has an obligation to allow all speakers

102

Ibid., 43.

103

Sam Kaner et.al., Facilitator’s Guide to Participatory Decision-Making, (Montpelier, Vermont: New

Society Publishers, 1996), 65. Kaner is talking about “tracking” here, but the same thing occurs during a

full group agenda setting time. Referred to below as: Facilitator’s Guide.

104

Building United Judgment, 47.

105

The value judgment idea comes from, Facilitator’s Guide, xiii.

106

Ibid., 32.

Page 36

regardless of their perspective the opportunity to state their opinion, as a member of the

group he is never a non-biased observer.

107

This gives the facilitator an extremely

powerful position within the group. He has the ability to determine which speakers have

the best perspectives—or the perspectives most similar to his own—and give those

speakers more time to talk. Likewise, facilitators are more likely to call on group

members who share the same opinions that they do, therefore limiting participation.

CCR asserts that “the facilitator should remain neutral and not participate in hot

debates,”

108

but that rarely happens when the facilitator is a member of the group. In

order to make the facilitator a more neutral observer and, in some cases, a mediator, the

facilitator should not be a member of the group. The facilitator would still be in a power

position; however, she would have less of an incentive to prevent speakers with

alternative perspectives from speaking. Allowing for more diverse speakers would create

more potential for full participation than consensus process as currently practiced does.

109

The vibes watcher is another group member holding a power position within the

group. According to CCR:

The vibes watcher pays attention to the emotional climate of the meeting and

communicates his or her observations to the group when it seems necessary.

“Hidden agendas” and unsurfaced conflicts can often be spotted early when

someone is watching for them.

110

This task is completed in practice by the vibes watcher yelling “vibes watch” at another

group member whenever a proposal becomes entrenched in heated debate and group

members begin to verbally attack each other. Through completing this task effectively,

the vibes watcher could increase participation by encouraging group members to discuss

107

Ibid., 60.

108

Building United Judgment, 53.

109

This will be more fully explained in Chapter 3.

Page 37

the issue thoroughly without getting angry at one another. However the vibes watcher,

like the facilitator is a biased individual, she can subjectively determine which side to yell

at. For example, if a group is discussing sponsoring a party and the vibes watcher is in

favor of the party she could yell “vibes watch” at a group member speaking out against

the party. This would likely stifle the debate and give the upper hand to the pro-party

perspective.

A vibes watcher can only be a nonpartisan observer of the debate by not being a

member of the group. In that case the vibes watcher would be capable of preventing

individuals from verbally attacking one another without taking sides. A nonpartisan vibes

watcher would be able to allow for greater deliberation and more inclusive democratic

practice.

Unequal Participation and Privileged Speaking Styles: Gender and Class

I have shown above how certain individuals holding power positions within the

group can privilege certain perspectives over others within consensus process. However,

the problem of unequal participation is not limited to the actions of the group facilitator

or the vibes watcher. “It’s a rare group in which each member is equally involved in each

meeting. Different degrees of interest, information, or styles of communication will

result in different levels of input during meetings.”

111

While levels of interest are

unavoidable, differences in access to information and privileging certain styles of

communication over others creates a power dynamic that runs contrary to the full

participation ideal of consensus process. Far more problematic is that this power dynamic

is often linked to inequalities in society. As noted in Chapter 1, certain speaking styles

110

Ibid., 47.

111

Ibid., 88.

Page 38

are sadly considered more acceptable in debates than others. Furthermore, individuals

from more privileged backgrounds are often given more credibility than those with

backgrounds from segments of society historically given second-class status.

While they attempt to create scenarios to equalize participation, such as rotating

the assigned roles, sitting in a circle and limiting the number of times individuals can

speak, even CCR admits that some problems may be more difficult to resolve.

112

“Perhaps women speak less in your group because they have been taught to be

unassertive, or because they have unconsciously realized that when they do speak, their

contributions carry less weight than those of male members.”

113

Mansbridge’s analysis of

the role of gender in participation in Helpline is highly perspicacious. She shows that

although Helpline had a “comparatively strong interest in women…derived form the

national strength of the women’s liberation movement” there were still very serious

examples of unequal participation based on gender.

114

“Women tended to talk and to

attend meetings slightly less often than the men, were less satisfied with the decisions at

Helpline, and perceived their own power as lower.”

115

Some of the reasons for this

unequal participation, Mansbridge found, were that the women were more likely to have

an “interruptible career orientation” and the female leadership was more likely to be

considered “bitchy.”

116

Although Mansbridge’s research is from the 1970s, in my experience, little has

changed. In October 2001, the women of the DC IMC came together to discuss the

112

Ibid. I have already discussed rotating assigned roles. Additionally, I’m opposed to limiting the number

of times an individual can speak at the meeting because this impedes full participation.

113

Ibid. Although this book was written in the early 80s, this problem exists in every group I have

participated in using consensus process.

114

Beyond Adversary Democracy, 191.

115

Ibid., 191-192.

116

Ibid., 193.

Page 39

gender inequalities we had experienced while working with that “participatory

democracy.” A two part list was created: the first section dealt with examples of gender

inequalities, while the second was a list of demands we hoped would create more

balanced participation. Some of the examples in the first section relate specifically to

projects within the DC IMC, however, many of them are very similar to Mansbridge’s

observations about Helpline.

Also noted were the countless women who came to one general meeting then

never came back, some of whom had vocalized their dislike of the male power

dynamic at play. …A woman told the group that she had done a gender tally of

who spoke at a general meeting this past spring, and the numbers were: 78 times

that men spoke to 6 times that women spoke, even though there were roughly

equal numbers of both at the meeting.

117

Research into other contemporary groups using consensus process with gender

inequalities shows that the DC IMC Women’s List was not unique.

118

While as a white-middle class female, I have had the most experience with gender

inequalities, inequalities based on race and class also exist in consensus process.

Although, I have seen examples of racism within consensus process oriented groups,

these examples are not documented in the same manner as the Women’s List was—that

is, the accounts of racism are not listed in a easily accessible location and were often

ignored comments during a meeting.

119

Unfortunately, Mansbridge’s analysis of race is

also limited because she “believed the important disabilities in participation to derive

117

DC IMC Women’s Meeting Notes, October 1, 2001. Found at:

http://lists.indymedia.org/mailman/public/imc-dc/2002-March/004434.html on August 1, 2002.

118

See my paper “Another World is Possible? Sexism in the Anti-Corporate Globalization Movement,”

which was presented in Spring 2002 to the St. Mary’s College Women’s Studies LLC Conference.

119

One example of this was in the fall of 2000 a black woman attending a DC IMC meeting being held in a

private residence. She was the only person of color at the meeting. She introduced herself as a documentary

filmmaker and she had brought a copy of a documentary she had made on the Free Mumia movement. She

stated that she was willing to allow her documentary to be used for an IMC fundraising project, but a white

male exclaimed that he had heard the documentary wasn’t very good and fundraising was not on the

agenda. She left shortly after that and never returned.

Page 40

from class, not race.”

120

Thus, her analysis of inequalities in participation based on class

differences is far more complete. In her interactions with the three working class and

non-college educated members of Helpline, she observed that they “were a great deal less

likely than their co-workers to speak at meetings, attend meetings, be perceived as

powerful, feel powerful, or feel satisfied with the decisions at Helpline.”

121

Her

interviews with the working-class members are even more telling as they describe why

they cannot participate as readily as the middle-class educated people can. The most

prevalent reason is simply that they cannot communicate using the same words and

speaking techniques.

122

Without the same language and rhetorical skills, working class

members are both alienated and limited in their ability to communicate during meetings.

In this case, sitting in a circle or limiting participation by those that speak often will not

give impetus to individuals who feel that they cannot participate as readily.

When There is No Consensus: Problems with Stage 2 and Stage 3

Stages 2 and 3 in Saint and Lawson’s chart only occur when there is an impasse

and a proposal does not have immediate unanimous support from the group. In this

situation, the most serious crisis of consensus process from Chapter 1—that it leads to

either stagnation or manipulation—occurs. When at least one member of a group dissents

from the majority opinion, that member has options to express dissent: standing aside,

blocking the proposal or leaving the group. Additionally, the group has the option of

excluding the dissenter from the group or falling back on a majority rule scheme. Each of

these options has frightening implications and each serves to show how consensus

process does not work.

120

Beyond Adversary Democracy, 195.

121

Ibid., 199.

Page 41

When a group member disagrees with a proposal, standing aside is the least

confrontational option she has. According to Saint and Lawson, “Group members stand

aside when they have concerns with a proposal, but they can live with it.”

123

They

explain that standing aside is different from abstaining in a majority rule decision-making

group because, “people may abstain for numerous reasons (i.e. ignorance, ambivalence,

or political posture), but standing aside is an option only for people with concerns.”

124

Concerns then must be related to the outcome of the proposal itself. In the above

example of the McDonalds owner, she could chose to “stand aside”—that is allow the

vegan group to picket outside the McDonalds—but have her concerns about the effect of

picketing noted in the group’s minutes. Standing aside in this case, is merely an

acknowledgement that not all the group members agree that the proposal will have the

best outcome. It is not a full recognition of the minority viewpoints because the concerns

of those who “stand aside” are unfortunately rarely recorded in the group’s minutes and

the concerns are not addressed at a later time.

There is another more problematic way of defining standing aside. Kaner’s

definition, “Stand Aside: I don’t like this, but I don’t want to hold up the group”

125

is an

assertion that unanimity does not exist. The McDonalds owner would not like the group

picketing outside of her restaurant, but by standing aside, would let the group move

forward with its proposal. “Standing aside” regardless of how it is defined, epitomizes

individual sacrifice for the collective.

122

Ibid., 200-201.

123

Rules for Consensus, 34.

124

Ibid.

125

Facilitator’s Guide, 212.

Page 42

The opposite of standing aside is one of the most controversial aspects of

consensus process: blocking.

126

Blocking consensus…occurs when one or a few individuals opposes an otherwise

agreed-upon decision that has been developed through full group participation.

After time and energy have been invested in discussion, debate, persuasion,

careful listening, impassioned argument, and other explorative and persuasive

interaction, after serious attempts to understand the issue have resulted in

agreement by almost all of the group, then a holdout can be called “blocking.”

127

There are several interesting things to note here: “full group participation” as

discussed above is a fallacy. The two appearances of “persuasion” in this quotation imply

manipulation. Furthermore, calling the person who disagrees with the group a “holdout”

shows the level of disrespect attached to individuals who refuse to yield to the collective

opinion of the group.

In a slightly ironic twist, those who advocate using consensus process cannot

reach a unanimous decision as to whether blocking should be a part of the process. Saint

and Lawson completely ignore blocking, where as CCR includes both a pro-blocking

essay and an anti-blocking essay.

128

The main reason blocking is controversial largely

because it gives an individual the power to determine the group’s decision. Since so

much of consensus process is about abdicating the self to the group, blocking is perhaps

the one outlet of individuality that exists. However, as CCR notes, “often those who

block consensus are made to feel guilty for slowing down the process or causing

126

Building United Judgment, 27.

127

Ibid., 29.

128

Ibid., 33-37. Additionally they include an essay entitled, “Our History: A Case Study of Blocking

Issues,” where they discuss why they included both opinions. They note during debate over the blocking

issue “…things got scary. Chel [pro-blocking] thought long and hard and just about decided to leave the

group over the blocking issue. …Meanwhile, Elaine [anti-blocking] was nearing a similar conclusion to

leave the group,” 29. In the end, they simply included both perspectives and explained blocking, without

reaching a consensus as to whether blocking was valuable.

Page 43

difficulty for the rest of the group.”

129

They continue, explaining the manipulative

qualities inherent in consensus process: “The larger group may intimidate the minority by

making them the center of attention and showering them with arguments about why they

are wrong.”

130

While they later note that this behavior runs contrary to the “respect” that

members deserve in consensus process, the fact that they use the word “often” to describe

the practice of intimidation shows the lack of respect that usually exists when blocking is

mentioned.

131

Furthermore, a group member who declares that they are blocking consensus

(“blocker”) may be completely ignored by the facilitator. In another example of the

methods in which a facilitator can abuse their power, he has the ability to decide if the

blocker is acting appropriately. After asking the blocker to “state their specific

objections” to the proposal, the facilitator can “state as objectively as possible that it is

his sense that the group has listened as well as it can, but the person’s concerns are not

appropriate.”

132

In a case like this, the blocker would probably wish to leave the group

because the facilitator has already made the decision that the blocker can be excluded

from the group. Saint and Lawson describe the process of an individual deciding to leave

the group and/or the group deciding that an individual should be excluded from the group

as following:

If members realize they are at dramatic odds with the group, they may want to

exclude themselves and allow the group to proceed. The group out of legitimate

concern for its own health, may choose to exclude members it feels are

destructive. It is important to remember that the group has the final responsibility

for determining which concerns are germane to the decision at hand. Individuals

129

Ibid., 32.

130

Ibid.

131

Ibid.

132

The Training/Action Affinity Group of Movement for a New Society, from Building Social Change

Communities, qtd. in Building United Judgment, 37.

Page 44

have the responsibility of making a good case for each concern, but the time

comes when the group must come first.

133

This is yet another example of individuals sacrificing themselves to the group or being

forced to make that sacrifice.

The final example of how consensus process breaks down during points of intense

conflict is the final alternative of reverting back to majority rule. One of the first sections

in Building United Judgment is called “The Inspirational Part: Majority Rule vs.

Consensus.” Here they argue the typical pro-consensus line of better decision-making

through consensus process, more participation and less of a “hierarchy of power.”

134

However, even CCR explains that some groups that typically use consensus process

revert back to majority rule decision-making when faced with difficult decisions. This is

used, “when consensus fails to produce a decision quickly enough for the needs of the

group.”

135

There are many different approaches a group that regularly uses consensus

process can take to reverting back to majority rule decision-making. They can use a

simple majority; however, it is more likely that they will use something more like a

supermajority. Saint and Lawson declare that, “A vote requiring 66 to 90 percent

majority for passage could approximate consensus if the group has exhausted its ability to

cooperate.”

136

An approximate consensus is not consensus, however. It is majority (or

super-majority) rule. And if consensus is a better decision-making process than majority

rule, why does it need to resort back to majority rule decision-making when decisions are

more difficult? The answer is simple: consensus process does not work.

133

Rules for Reaching Consensus, 49.

134

Building United Judgment, 4-7.

135

Building United Judgment, 100.

136

Rules for Reaching Consensus, 48.

Page 45

Large Group Consensus Process as Representative Democracy

Consensus process within a small group has been shown to be a decision-making

process filled with problems. It is not the only type of consensus process that is used. In

some circumstances, particularly in the anti-corporate globalization, a larger scale version

of consensus process must be used to accommodate many more people. In the case of the

anti-corporate globalization movement, planning for a massive demonstration involves

more than 50 people. Planning involves the participation of hundreds if not thousands of

planners. In this situation, full participation is altogether impossible. Adherents of

consensus process have created a mechanism, called the spokescouncil model for use

with larger groups. CCR refers to this as a “representative method.”

137

It works like this: small groups, known as affinity groups of “eight to 15 people”

send a representative, “known as a ‘spoke’” to the spokescouncil meeting.

138

The spoke

receives a proposal at the spokes meeting and returns to the affinity group to reach

consensus on the proposal. The spoke then returns to the spokescouncil meeting “with

feedback from their groups and acceptance or rejection of the proposal.”

139

There are

opportunities to block proposals within the small groups, whose spoke then represents the

block during the spokescouncil meeting.

140

For example, each year thousands of people plan to come to Washington, DC to

protest meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. These

people are broken down into affinity groups who each send a spoke to the spokescouncil

meeting. One of the potential proposals at the spokescouncil meeting could be to have a

137

Building United Judgment, 99.

138

Ibid., 99-100.

139

Ibid.

140

Ibid.

Page 46

mass demonstration beginning in front of the IMF headquarters at 9am on Saturday. The

spoke would return to her affinity group to reach consensus on the proposal. If one

affinity group cannot reach consensus on 9am and instead chooses to push for 10am, their

spoke must represent that opinion in the spokescouncil meeting. If another affinity group

decides to push for a mass demonstration beginning at Freedom Plaza and still another

affinity group pushes for a mass demonstration on Friday, then the original proposal has

three possible changes. Each time a change is approved the spoke must return to her

affinity group to reach consensus.

141

Given the significant amount of time spent running between affinity groups and

the spokescouncil, it is easy to see why large group consensus process would be

cumbersome. CCR however expresses the positive perspective. “This process is long and

arduous, but it ensures that decisions represent input from everyone in the group.

Reaching a decision sometimes takes many hours,” but according to CCR, “people who

have used this method have generally found it worth the trouble.”

142

This seems unlikely.

Since consensus process within a small group does not ensure input from all participants,

it is difficult to see why it would suddenly become more participatory (“everyone”) with

more participants.

The larger problem with the spokescouncil model is that consensus process is

largely a rejection of representative democracy. The spokes may be slightly more

accountable to their affinity group constituents than members of Congress are to the

voters, but the spokescouncil model is still representative. When the final vote is taken

141

Ibid.

142

Ibid.

Page 47

within the spokescouncil, only the spokes participate. The other “participants” in the

affinity groups can only hope that their spoke represents their views accurately.

It is a scathing indictment, but participants in consensus process can only hope for

a number of things. They can only hope that conflict can be avoided. They can only hope

that minority viewpoints will be fully deliberated upon. They can only hope that the

facilitator and the vibes watcher will not engage in partisan politics. They can only hope

that everyone will agree with a proposal. But hoping that consensus process will happen

exactly as it theoretically should does not make for a solid alternative to representative

democracy.

Page 48

Chapter 3: Democratic Conclusions

I began Chapter 1 with an analysis of the decline of American participation in

democracy. Because the United States is a representative democracy, that decline in

participation is largely based on the readily available statistics that show a pronounced

decrease in voter turnout. I briefly discussed some of the theories that attempt to account

for this dramatic shift in participation. The most appealing theory on why this decline

exists belonged to Barber, who argued that the lack of participation was caused by

representative democracy itself. In this chapter I will return to representative democracy

and some recent schemes for increasing participation with in it and I will also reevaluate

various participatory approaches. My conclusion will show that by ridding these some of

these participatory theories of the anti-democratic components, new options for

democracy can be created.

Can Representative Democracy be Reformed?

Lisa Jane Disch thoughtfully suggests a new reason for the decline in American

democracy; she blames the two-party system and the various ways in which it became the

American political system. For Disch, the two party system is “an electoral duopoly that

locks out competition from alternative parties, mobilizes less than half of the electorate,

and emphases national parties and elections over state and local organizations.”

143

Furthermore, she argues that the structure of the two-party system has marginalized other

types of democratic activities leaving voting for one major party candidate or the other as

the only method of “legitimate, rational” participation.

144

But participation has dropped

because the choice between only two candidates makes it difficult to find a candidate

143

Lisa Jane Disch, The Tyranny of the Two-Party System, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002),

57.

Page 49

who will really represent the views of the voter. Disch asks pointedly, “why should it be

‘rational’ to cast a major-party vote for a candidate who has no intention of representing

you, whereas to cast a third-party vote for a candidate who has no chance of winning is

deemed ‘wasted?’”

145

It is important to note that Disch is not challenging representative

democracy here. The two-party system fails to give voters enough options to find

representatives that will support their views, but in Disch’s view, the representative

system itself is not necessarily flawed.

Instead of focusing on the problem of representation as alienating, as Barber does,

Disch proposes giving voters more choices at the ballot box through fusion. Fusion is a

scheme where third parties can share candidates with major parties on the ballot. This

option would potentially increase voter participation and end the demobilization many

Americans feel.

146

However, fusion as a representative democracy reform method, would

not allow people the opportunity make democratic decisions themselves. Fusion is not a

participatory democracy approach.

On the whole, Disch seems to dismiss participatory democracy because it

“[exhibits] a preoccupation with self-government that…overshadows political

opposition.”

147

After listing many of these participatory democracy proposals, such as

those by Fishkin and Barber, Disch asks: “how will you turn out the people?”

148

However, she later states: “It is as if citizens who are uninspired by the charade of

representative government would flock to the new age agora on the strength of the

infinitely more rewarding (albeit more time-consuming) practice of citizenship

144

Ibid, 81.

145

Ibid., 8.

146

Ibid., 109.

147

Ibid., 121.

Page 50

[participatory democracy] demands.”

149

This statement shows two things: Disch

acknowledges that for many people representative democracy is not the most satisfying

example of democracy and participatory democracy is largely a much more enticing

option. Fusion may increase voting options and perhaps increase opposition, but it will

never allow be as fulfilling as participatory democracy.

Can Consensus Process Be Reformed? Or Improving Communication Problems

Representative democracy is certainly simpler than participatory democracy.

Individuals in a representative system can merely go to the ballot box and claim that they

have been good citizens and have “participated” in the democratic process. Participatory

democracy requires much more; it requires citizens to take full responsibility for the

decisions they make because those decisions become policies. This is largely why

participatory democracy is more fulfilling for individuals than representative democracy.

I have struggled to formulate a mechanism to help understand that not all

participatory schemes are participatory democracies. This is largely because I have been

working with the idea that in order for a participatory process to be considered

democratic it must value all patterns of communication and allow conflict/dissent to

thrive. I briefly mentioned Iris Marion Young’s “communicative democracy” earlier as

an improvement on deliberative democracy. Her communicative democracy has several

distinguishing features, which would limit the lack of participation by those in the

minority.

First, she argues for greeting, which would make people feel more comfortable in

participating. Young notes that greetings “bring people together warmly, seeing

148

Ibid., 107.

149

Ibid.

Page 51

conditions for amicability: smiles, handshakes, hugs, the giving and taking of food and

drink.”

150

Second, she proposes including rhetoric, which would connect people’s

emotions to the speaker and make the discussion less boring.

151

Finally, she proposes

including storytelling. This is the most important of the three ways to include minorities

in the discourse, because it is something everyone can participate in.

152

Young notes,

allowing people to tell stories of their own personal experience, not only encourages

participation, but encourages those in the majority to see a multiplicity of perspectives.

“Narrative also contributes to political argument by the social knowledge it offers of how

social segments view one another’s actions and what are the likely effects of policies and

actions on people in different social locations.”

153

Thus, Young’s proposal adds greater

depth to the possibility for a truly participatory democracy.

Following Young, I believe that participatory democracy must not privilege

certain types of communication over others. A hierarchy of speech where the words of

“better educated white middle class people”

154

—or any other privileged group—are more

valued than the words of others creates a version of elitism, not much different from our

current representative system where the hierarchy is based on money. Democracy should

not be elitist. Consensus process, on the other had, often is very elitist. I discussed in

Chapter 2, using both Mansbridge’s observations and my own, how consensus process

fails to value all forms of communication. In-house facilitators who play off of existing

power dynamics within the group often exacerbate this problem by carefully selecting

individuals to speak and occasionally cutting off those who do not have the same

150

Iris Marion Young, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,” in Democracy

and Difference, 129.

151

Ibid.

152

Ibid., 132.

Page 52

knowledge of conventional speaking techniques as others. While consensus process could

be improved by having outside facilitators moderate discussion, valuing all types of

communication must be done by the group as a whole.

155

In order to accomplish this,

groups could constantly reevaluate themselves and make a solid commitment to not base

decisions on the method of communication alone.

Can Consensus Process Be Reformed? Or, Rejecting Unanimity

In chapter 1, I looked at theorists, including Benhabib, who charge consensus

process with being anti-democratic because it privileges unanimity over conflict and thus,

stifles dissent. Having rejected “radical participatory democratic theories” by refusing to

support unanimity, Benhabib offers an alternative method of advocating deliberative

democracy. At first, she offers support for majority rule because it allows decisions to be

reevaluated and revised.

…in many instances majority rule is a fair and rational decision procedure, not

because legitimacy resides in numbers but because if a majority of people are

convinced at one point on the basis of reasons formulated as closely as possible as

a result of a process of discursive deliberation that conclusion A is the right thing

to do, then this conclusion can remain valid until challenged by good reasons by

some other group.

156

However, Benhabib’s deliberative democracy does not simply stop with majority rule.

She also advocates an “opposition party,” similar to a parliamentary opposition party that

would alleviate concerns of tyranny of the majority by scrutinizing the majority

opinion.

157

Furthermore, she rejects the concept of one deliberative body that makes all

the decisions as impossible in modern society instead favoring “a plurality of modes of

153

Ibid.

154

Ibid., 124.

155

Building United Judgment, 89.

156

Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy and Difference,

72.

157

Ibid, 72.

Page 53

association” such as “citizens initiatives, social movements, voluntary associations, and

consciousness-raising groups.”

158

Benhabib’s argument is more far reaching than small

groups using consensus process; however, her proposals are important to groups using

consensus process. Following Benhabib, small groups should use majority rule and the

minority perspective should hold the majority accountable for their actions. Large groups

using consensus, such as the spokescouncil model, seem absurd because they attempt

“mass assembly” when they should be an “interlocking net” to achieve a “public

conversation.”

159

The Difficulty of Instituting Change

In chapter 2, I showed in practice how “blockers” were often prevented from

making their objections known by being alienated from the group or expelled from the

group. Participatory democracy requires an opportunity for dissenters to air their

concerns with developing policy and have those concerns documented. Participatory

democracy then, requires decisions made through majority rule. In chapter 2, I noted that

many groups that use consensus process have a majority rule fallback. Instituting

majority rule in these consensus process based groups would not be that difficult since a

precedent already exists. However, other groups still hold that consensus process is the

best alternative to representative democracy. These groups use the standard concerns with

tyranny of the majority as a basis for rejecting majority rule.

There is an incorrect assumption that on the one hand majority rule will

necessarily lead to tyranny of the majority, while, on the other consensus process will

necessarily avoid such tyranny through deliberation and unanimity. However, in majority

158

Ibid., 72-73.

159

Ibid, 73-74.

Page 54

rule based systems the minority opinion is allowed to exist. During debate on a piece of

legislation, group members can disagree with the majority. Members in the minority can

speak out against the majority in debate without fear that they are leading to the

destruction of the group. Finally, when a vote is taken on a piece of legislation it is clear

that there was opposition if there are votes against it.

On the other hand, in consensus process a minority opinion is often stifled the

moment it is uttered. Group members with a minority perspective on a piece of

legislation are hushed in debate for fear of conflict. Those with minority opinions are

forced to relinquish individual responsibility to the collective by standing aside or face

intense scrutiny or even dismissal from the group if they block the legislation. In

consensus process when a “vote” is taken minority opinions are often not even

documented. Tyranny of the majority already exists therefore, not only as a possibility of

majority rule, but as an intrinsic part of consensus process. The only way to make

consensus process less tyrannical is to push it in the direction of majority rule.

It would not be difficult for groups interested in turning from the anti-democratic

consensus process towards a truly participatory democracy to make that shift. They

would simply have to make an honorable commitment to valuing all types of speech and

rejecting unanimity in favor of a majority rule scheme where dissenters can object to the

policy and have that objection well documented in case the policy needs to be revised in

the future. While these shifts are small enough to easily be changed, they do represent a

dramatic turn away from consensus process toward a new more participatory democracy.

It is difficult to imagine these participatory democracy ideas implemented on the

large scale initially. For instance, although voting turnout has dramatically decreased in

Page 55

the United States, I do not believe that this country is ready to experience this type of

participatory democracy on the nation state level just yet. Instead, this practice could

begin in small groups where a diverse population could be exposed to them. While I think

many of Barber’s proposals for creating participatory democracy in the United States

would be extremely detrimental (especially allowing “informal lay justice” and an

“internal voucher system”), he does suggest that participatory democracy should begin in

neighborhoods and workplaces.

160

Disch criticizes Barber and other participatory theorists because they fail to

answer the important question, “how will you turn out the people.”

161

However, most

people simply have a deeper and more personal connection to their neighborhoods than

their Congressional representatives. The issues that they would discuss in these smaller

arenas would be ones that concern them directly. If experiments in participatory

democracy began in the neighborhoods people would gain experience in the art of

deliberation in an already comfortable arena. Additionally, students should experience

participatory democracy as part of their education system because they will someday

practice it fully within their communities.

Rounding the circle

In September 2001, I began this project before a DC IMC meeting. Throughout

the spring and summer of 2002, when I was actively engaged in the research and writing

of this project, I avoided DC IMC meetings. A few members were aware that I was

working on this project and periodically asked me for updates, but on the whole I was

ignored. In late August 2002, I attended my first meeting in over six months. During the

160

Barber, Strong Democracy, 307.

161

Disch, The Tyranny of the Two Party System, 107.

Page 56

announcement time I informed the group that I wanted to present my argument that

consensus process was anti-democratic in a forum for the community. In order to make

the forum more balanced, I asked if anyone would be willing to present the alternative

perspective—that is, state why consensus process is democratic. This announcement was

posted over a listserv that has hundreds of members. So far, I have received no offers to

take me up on the challenge.

Some people within the DC IMC have suggested that they would be willing to

look into a new approach for decision making because they are not dedicated to using

consensus process. In recent months as my analysis has become more complete, the

discussions on switching from consensus process to majority rule have become more

substantial, but the group has not yet decided to formally switch over. Perhaps after

reading my argument they will be ready to move toward a truly participatory democracy.

Since this project began with that in mind, I would be overjoyed.

Page 57